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Abstract
This paper investigates the long-term eﬀect of financial development on eco-
nomic growth using annual data for 67 countries over the period 1971 to 2007.
Both autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and cross-sectionally augmented
autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) models are applied to count for cross-
country heterogeneity and error cross-country dependence. The results uphold
a positive and significant eﬀect of financial development on long-run per capita
output. There is also some evidence of a non-linear relationship between finan-
cial development and growth. However, the analysis also reveals that the results
derive primarily from non-democratic countries.
Keywords: Economic growth; Financial development; Democracy
JEL Classification: O16; O43; P16
1. Introduction
The relationship between financial development and economic performance
is a controversial topic in growth economics. As far back as the start of the
twentieth century, a burgeoning volume of literature emphasized the importance
of the functions of financial sector as a driver of economic progress. (Schum-
peter (1912); McKinnon (1973); Shaw (1973)). A well-developed financial sector
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is thought to promote long-term economic growth by facilitating transactions, 
mobilizing savings and diversifying risk (Beck et al. (2000)). However, as some-
times witnessed, excessive speculative activities and financial resource misallo-
cation inevitably shed doubt on the expected growth-enhancing role of financial 
development.
A parallel, somewhat more recent, development in the growth literature is the 
eﬀect of democracy on economic performance. Thus, for example, Acemoglu et al. 
(2014) revealed some evidence of a beneficial eﬀect of democracy for socio-
economic outcomes. Nevertheless, to date, empirics has largely ignored the 
moderating role of democracy on the relationship between finance and eco-nomic 
performance. This paper therefore aims to contribute to the literature by 
examining the degree to which democracy strengthens, or weakens, the impact 
of financial development on growth.
Furthermore, despite the increasing sophistication of the estimation meth-
ods, growth empirics are never free from criticism regarding methodology. In 
particular, as suggested by Durlauf et al. (2005), Eberhardt and Teal (2011) 
and Pesaran (2015), cross-country heterogeneity and cross-section dependence, 
which are largely ignored in the majority of existing growth literature, have 
challenged the standard cross-country and panel growth regression frameworks.
Using both error correction-based autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and 
cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) models, 
this paper aims to address these concerns by applying recent heterogeneous 
panel estimation methods to account for slope heterogeneity and error cross-
country dependence. The results confirm that financial development is capable 
of stimulating output in the long term, although such a beneficial eﬀect is largely 
driven by non-democratic countries. In addition, the results provide some, albiet 
limited, evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between financial devel-
opment and economic performance, suggesting that over-development of the 
financial sector can be detrimental to growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
brief overview of the literature examining the relationship between both finan-
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cial development and democracy on growth. Cross-country heterogeneity and
dependence along with nonlinearity are addressed in Section 3. This Section
also outlines the models employed in the analysis. Following a description of
the data in Section 4, Section 5 presents the results. A summary discussion of
the results and their implications conclude the paper.
2. Growth, Financial Development & Democracy
The relationship between economic performance and financial development 
has a long history dating back to Smith (1776) and Hamilton (1781). Since 
then, various scholars, such as Schumpeter (1912), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973), have stressed the irreplaceable role of finance in the economy. In partic-
ular, at the theoretical level, a well-developed financial system would promote 
economic growth via its functions of information production, corporate gov-
ernance, risk diversification, savings mobilization, and transaction facilitating 
(Beck et al. (2000)). Meanwhile, inspired by the seminal contribution of King 
and Levine (1993a,b), empirical investigation on this relationship has gradually 
emerged since the 1990s. The majority of empirical investigations in the next 20 
years continued to support a strong relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. Among these are the studies of Levine et al. (2000), 
Beck et al.(2000) and Beck and Levine (2004).
However, sight was not lost though on the fact that certain studies have 
uncovered evidence of the detrimental eﬀect of domestic financial development 
for long-term growth prospects. Indeed, the idea that there may be a threshold 
above which further financial development brings about negative returns can be 
traced back as far as Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky (1991). More recent 
research of Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Law and Singh (2014), Beck et al.
(2014), Arcand et al. (2015), and Courne`de and Denk (2015), also suggested a 
high level of financial development could be a drag on economic growth due
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to talent misallocation and speculative bubbles. Moreover, it is indicated in 
recent literature that eﬀect of growth of finance could depend on the specific 
institutional condition in a specific economy. For example, Menyah et al. (2014) 
observed that financial system development failed to promote domestic output 
growth in Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo and Sudan. Inter-
estingly, the countries mentioned above commonly lack democratic 
institutions, which is salient in view of the fact that authors such as Acemoglu 
et al. (2014), and Madsen et al. (2015), have highlighted democracy as a 
major driver of growth.
Theoretical debate on the role of a political system on economic growth has 
also been ongoing for decades and, as a result, three predominant opinions on the 
influence of the democratic system on growth have emerged. First, the compati-
bility school argues a democratic political system is best suited for countries pur-
suing sustainable growth via its inherent advantages in protecting the private 
sphere, ensuring socio-economic rights, and limiting state intervention 
(Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Acemoglu et al. (2014)). Subject to strong 
public checks, decision-making processes in democratic states essentially prevent 
attempts of monopolizing lucrative economic opportunities, thus benefiting  long-
term growth (Acemoglu et al. (2008); Acemoglu and Robinson (2013)). While the 
second perspective, the conflict school, suggests non-democratic states are capa-
ble of resisting immediate consumption demands and prohibiting dysfunctional 
consequences in the decision-making procedure through suppressing individual 
incomes and labor unions (Przeworski and Limongi (1993); Olson (2000)). De-
spite the cost of economic and political freedom, non-democratic rulers could 
outperform democratic ones in smoothing resource allocation, stimulating in-
vestment and, eventually, promoting long-term economic growth (Sirowy and 
Inkeles (1990); Przeworski and Limongi (1993)). A third view, the sceptical 
perspective, however, advocates the nonexistence of a systematic connection be-
tween democracy and growth (Sirowy and Inkeles (1990)). Typically, because 
countries with distinct political systems can choose the same economic 
policies, democracy is not viewed as the key to economic growth according to 
Barro (1997).
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At the empirical level, a consensus of the eﬀect of democracy on economic 
performance has not yet been reached. Previous cross-country analyses, such as 
Barro (1996), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (2008), did 
not reach agreement on the exact eﬀect of democracy on economic performance. 
Likewise, panel data studies have also not succeeded in resolving the issue: Rock 
(2009) and Knutsen (2013) provided some evidence on the positive direct eﬀect of 
democracy on economic performance in the context of Sub-Saharan African 
countries and Asian countries respectively. With a large panel of 175 nations over 
the period 1960 to 2010, Acemoglu et al. (2014) also revealed evidence of a 
significantly positive impact of democracy on growth. However, in con-trast, 
some others, including Murtin and Wacziarg (2014), and Jacob and Os-ang 
(2015), failed to observe any significant influence of democracy on economic 
performance.
It is also worth noting that democracy could be potentially capable of ex-
erting a significant eﬀect of long-term economic performance indirectly through 
diverse channels. The indirect channels that examined in the previous literature 
include property rights, income inequality, human capital, government size and 
trade openness (Przeworski and Limongi (1993); Helliwell (1994); Tavares and 
Wacziarg (2001); Baum and Lake (2003); Gerring et al. (2005)).
3. Methodology
Nothwithstanding the popularity of the panel ARDL model, such an ap-
proach fails to account for potential error cross-sectional dependence. Thus,
in addition to the ARDL model, this study employs the cross-sectionally aug-
mented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) model (Chudik and Pesaran
(2015); Cavalcanti et al. (2015)). In essence, the CS-ARDL model augments
the ARDL model with a linear combination of the cross-sectional averages of
both the dependent variables and of all the regressors, which aims to capture
the cross-sectional correlation in the error term. Typically, as shown by Chudik
and Pesaran (2015), both mean group (MG) and pooled mean group (PMG)
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estimators are used in the estimation of the CS-ARDL model. Of course, the 
time-dimension (T) needs to be large enough so that the model can be estimated 
for each cross-country unit. Also, a suﬃcient number of lagged cross-section av-
erages should be included to ensure the validity of these estimators.
The mean group (MG) estimator initially requires estimating time series 
equations for each country separately. The coeﬃcients across countries can 
then can be computed as the unweighted means of the estimated coeﬃcients. 
Pesaran (2015) suggested that the MG estimator provides consistent estimates 
of the average of the parameters given a suﬃciently large time-series dimension. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that the MG estimator does not impose 
any restrictions on the cross-sectional parameters and ignores the possibility 
that some parameters can be the same across countries. Given the fact that all 
intercepts and coeﬃcients can diﬀer freely, the technique aﬀords the maximum 
degree of heterogeneity. However, the shortcomings of such an approach are 
quite apparent. Although consistent, the MG estimator is likely to be ineﬃcient 
for a small cross-country dimension (N). Also, as noted by Arnold et al. (2011) 
and Samargandi et al. (2015), this estimator is sensitive to any country outliers 
which may aﬀect the averages of the country coeﬃcients severely.
An alternative method is the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator pro-
posed by Pesaran et al. (1999). In particular, this PMG approach has been 
applied widely in recent empirical growth studies; such as, Loayza and Ranciere 
(2006), Arnold et al. (2011),Samargandi et al. (2015), and Cavalcanti et al.
(2015), largely due to it being an intermediate routine between the averaging 
and pooling methods of estimation. Specifically, a two-step procedure is applied. 
First, the long-term slope coeﬃcients are estimated jointly across countries via 
a concentrated maximum likelihood procedure. Second, given the estimates of 
the long-term slope coeﬃcients, intercepts, short-term coeﬃcients, the speed 
of adjustment, and error variances are estimated through maximum likelihood 
on a county-by-country basis. Such an approach essentially restricts the long-
term slope coeﬃcients to be homogeneous over the cross-sections, but otherwise 
allows for heterogeneity. Given a large cross- country dimension, this PMG
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approach also provides consistent estimates of the mean of the short-term co-
eﬃcients across countries by averaging individual country coeﬃcients (Loayza 
and Ranciere (2006); Samargandi et al. (2015)).
It is worth noting here that several conditions are required to ensure the va-
lidity of the PMG estimator (Samargandi et al. (2015); Cavalcanti et al. (2015)). 
Firstly, there must exist a long-term relationship among the variables of interest. 
This is checked via a negative and significant coeﬃcient on the error correction 
term. Secondly, the dynamic specification of the model should be suﬃciently 
augmented so that the regressors can be treated as weakly exogenous. Thirdly, 
the resulting residuals from the error correction model must be serially uncor-
related.
Obviously, the selection between MG and PMG approaches rests on whether 
homogeneous slopes can be imposed for the estimated long-term parameters. 
Hence, it essentially involves a trade-oﬀ between consistency and eﬃciency. If 
the long-term coeﬃcients are, in fact, not equal across countries, the MG es-
timates of the mean of long-term coeﬃcients are consistent while the PMG 
estimates are inconsistent. However, if the homogeneity restrictions are valid, 
estimators that impose cross-country constraints dominate the heterogeneous 
ones in terms of eﬃciency. So, when the long-run coeﬃcients are the same for 
individual countries, both MG and PMG estimates are consistent, but only the 
latter are eﬃcient (Arnold et al. (2011); Loayza and Ranciere (2006); Samar-
gandi et al. (2015)).
In practice, the PMG approach often is regarded as best available com-
promise for consistency and eﬃciency (Samargandi et al. (2015); Cavalcanti 
et al. (2015)). In terms of the finance-growth nexus, previous studies, includ-
ing Loayza and Ranciere (2006),Arnold et al. (2011), andSamargandi et al.
(2015), have implied that there is a homogeneous long-term relationship across 
countries. Short-term adjustment, on the other hand, could be aﬀected by 
country-specific monetary policies, laws and regulations, as well as macroeco-
nomic fundamentals and hence is expected to be subject to a substantial degree 
of heterogeneity (Samargandi et al. (2015); Cavalcanti et al. (2015)).
7
The empirical models used for this study are based on the ARDL and CS-
ARDL model specifications. We initially employ the error correction form of
the ARDL model:








ij∆xi,t−j + εit (1)
where yit is the real per capita output (GDP ) for country i at time t. xit is a 4×1
vector of explanatory variables; domestic investment to output (INV EST ), the
secondary school enrollment rate (SSE) from the Cross-National Time-Series
Data Archive, the corrected population growth rate (POP ) private credit by
financial institutions to output (FINDEV ) and its square (FINDEV 2). All
variables are natural logs. Both long-run and short-run behaviour can be estab-
lished from (1). θi represents the long-term equilibrium relationship between
xit and yit while φij and δij capture the short-term dynamics between variables.
αi reflects the speed of convergence of the economy to long-term equilibrium.
Meanwhile, terms in parentheses represent the cointegrating relationship be-
tween between xit and yit.
The traditional panel ARDL approach accounts for slope heterogeneity along
with diﬀerent orders of integration in the variables, and can be applied regard-
less of whether the regressors are exogenous or not. However, Phillips and Sul
(2003) highlighted potential problems if the cross-section correlation in the er-
rors is ignored. To overcome this, the panel CS-ARDL model is employed, which
involves augmenting the right-hand side variable set with the cross-sectional av-
erages of the independent variables, the dependent variables, and a series of
their lag values (Pesaran (2006); Chudik et al. (2013); Eberhardt and Pres-
bitero (2015)). These additional terms serve to account for the cross-sectional
correlation in the error term. The resulting model is:
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where yt and xt are the cross-section averages of yit and xit. Noticeably, we
distinguish the short-term and long-term behaviors of the cross-sectional cor-
relation in equation (2). Following Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), only the
level parts of cross-sectional averages are included in the long-term equilibrium
relationship in parentheses. Meanwhile, the long-run coeﬃcients relating yit
and xit; i.e. θi, and the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium, αi,
are the key coeﬃcients of interest. The short-run coeﬃcients, φij and δij are
also reported for completeness.
4. Data
For the empirical work it is necessary to employ data with suﬃciently large
time and cross-section dimensions to allow for cross-sectional slope heterogeneity
and residual cross-sectional dependence (Samargandi et al. (2015); Cavalcanti
et al. (2015)). Here we select 1971 to 2007 with the choice of the end date being
governed by avoiding excessive noise in the data caused by the Global Financial
Crisis.
Given such conditions, we only include countries for which there are 37
consecutive observations and, as a result, we end up with a balanced dataset,
covering 67 countries over the period 1971 to 2007. The list of countries included
can be found in the Appendix.
In addition to the right-hand side variables outlined in the previous sec-
tion, we also use the dichotomous democracy indices of Cheibub et al. (2010)
and Acemoglu et al. (2014). We define a country as a democracy if both two
measures have a value of 1 for at least 19 out of 37 years over the sample pe-
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riod. Otherwise, the country is identified as a non-democractic state. On this
definition, 38 nations are classified as democracies and 29 as non-democractic.
Table 1 below displays the summary statistics of variables for the whole
sample and the sub-samples. From Table 1, the average annual growth rate of
real per capita output is 1.6% for all 67 nations. The 38 democratic nations
have enjoyed a relatively high average output growth rate whereas the non-
democratic countries recorded an average annual growth rate of only 0.9%. In
terms of the level of per capita output, the democratic sub-sample largely out-
performed the nondemocratic subsample. It is worth noting that the variation
of the per capita output over the period under investigation is comparable for
all countries. In terms of investment and schooling, the democratic nations have
experienced higher rates than their non-democratic counterparts. The average
population growth rate of 29 non-democratic economies is higher than that of
38 democracies. In addition, despite the fact that the levels of financial devel-
opment vary dramatically within the 38 democratic nations, the average private
credit indicator is twice as large as that of non-democractic countries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Whole Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 2,412 0.016 0.046 -0.298 0.314
GDP 2,479 11679.220 12742.030 518.180 94431.080
INV EST 2,479 0.198 0.093 0.006 0.546
SSE 2,479 0.056 0.031 0.001 0.166
POP 2,479 0.069 0.011 0.041 0.115
FINDEV 2,479 0.373 0.353 0.011 1.981
Panel B: Democracy Sub-sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 1,368 0.022 0.036 -0.161 0.198
GDP 1,406 16152.180 12180.800 1148.387 58643.040
INV EST 1,406 0.229 0.080 0.049 0.516
SSE 1,406 0.068 0.027 0.007 0.166
POP 1,406 0.064 0.009 0.047 0.087
FINDEV 1,406 0.501 0.391 0.033 1.981
Panel C: Non-democracy Sub-sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH 1,044 0.009 0.056 -0.298 0.314
GDP 1,073 5818.103 10964.380 518.180 94431.080
INV EST 1,073 0.157 0.094 0.006 0.546
SSE 1,073 0.040 0.028 0.001 0.126
POP 1,073 0.076 0.009 0.041 0.115
FINDEV 1,073 0.205 0.194 0.011 1.552




As discussed above, the panel ARDL approach is valid irrespective of whether
the underlying variables are I(0) or I(1), or a mixture of the two. Hence, it is
important to examine the time series properties of the these. Two panel unit
root tests, i.e. Im et al. (2003) (IPS) and Pesaran (2007) cross-sectionally aug-
mented IPS (CIPS) tests, are conducted here. The IPS test generally allows
for heterogeneous autoregressive parameters for each panel. All panels have a
unit root under the null hypothesis of the IPS test. A rejection of the null is an
indication that a non-zero fraction of panels is stationary. However, as stated
by Cavalcanti et al. (2015) and Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), the presence
of cross sectional dependence threatens the validity of standard panel unit root
tests. Hence, we also apply the CIPS test proposed by Pesaran (2007). In par-
ticular, this test allows for heterogeneous unit root processes via an augmented
the ADF regressions for each country with cross section averages. Tables 2 and
3 report the results of IPS and CIPS tests for GDP , INV EST , HC, POP ,
FINDEV , and FINDEV 2 for the whole sample. For lags between 1 and 3
two test scenarios are presented, one which includes both an intercept and a
linear time trend and another including only the intercept.
From both tables, GDP can be identified as I(1) series while SSE is generally
I(0). Overall, mixed results are observed on the time series in levels. However,
a panel unit root process is rejected after using first-diﬀerences in both the IPS
and CIPS tests. As a result, the validity of panel ARDL approach is guaranteed
as our estimation model does not contain I(2) series. This also holds for both
the democratic and non-democratic sub-samples.
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Table 2: Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) IPS Test: Full Sample
With an intercept and a linear trend
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP -1.362* 0.067 -1.379 1
INV ESTMENT -3.548*** -1.247 -1.107 1
SSE -3.482*** -5.182*** -6.182*** 0
POP -35.700*** 4.182 -5.111*** 1
FINDEV -3.022** -0.688 -2.515*** 1
FINDEV 2 -4.293*** -2.911*** -4.320*** 0
With an intercept
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP 6.341 7.963 6.848 1
INV ESTMENT -4.940*** -2.752*** -2.459*** 0
SSE -4.206*** -4.091*** -4.831*** 0
POP -19.769*** 7.369 -0.744 1
FINDEV -0.979 0.200 -0.574 1
FINDEV 2 -4.755*** -4.276*** -4.791*** 0
∆GDP -21.765*** -13.442*** -12.520*** 0
∆INV ESTMENT -29.767*** -20.164*** -15.902*** 0
∆SSE -11.120*** -8.575*** -10.410*** 0
∆POP -35.849*** -6.943*** -6.183*** 0
∆FINDEV -20.458*** -13.319*** -11.105*** 0
∆(FINDEV 2) -21.358*** -14.794*** -12.541*** 0
Notes: The null hypothesis is that all panels contain unit roots. *** significant at 1%; **
significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 3: Pesaran (2007) CIPS Test: Full Sample
With an intercept and a linear trend
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP -3.759* 0.504 -0.162 1
INV ESTMENT -5.619*** -2.542*** -1.572* 0
SSE -1.657** -1.430* -1.348* 0
POP -24.485*** 5.310 -0.970*** 1
FINDEV -2.585*** 0.364 -0.500 1
FINDEV 2 -3.224*** -0.522 0.161 1
With an intercept
Variables Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Integration Order
GDP -1.435* 1.193 0.550 1
INV ESTMENT -3.789*** -0.701 0.064 1
SSE -4.290*** -5.184*** -4.074*** 0
POP -26.334*** 1.485 -5.311*** 1
FINDEV -3.513*** -1.154 -1.885** 1
(FINDEV 2) -2.830*** -0.924 -0.143 1
∆GDP -19.408*** -11.069*** -9.154*** 0
∆INV ESTMENT -25.407*** -17.238*** -13.103*** 0
∆SSE -10.285*** -7.182*** -7.301*** 0
∆POP -24.659*** -4.337*** -3.127*** 0
∆FINDEV -15.268*** -9.775*** -7.489*** 0
∆(FINDEV 2) -16.242*** -11.433*** -8.751*** 0
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the series is a unit root. Cross-section dependence is assumed
to be in form of a single unobserved common factor. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at
5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 4 presents results derived from the ECM specification for the full
sample. Following Samargandi et al. (2015), a quadratic term of the financial
development indicator is included to capture the potential non-linear association
between financial development and economic performance. As stated earlier, it
is likely that the MG estimator is sensitive to country outliers and ineﬃcient in a
panel with a small cross-country dimension. In comparison, the PMG estimator
is viewed as oﬀering an attractive trade-oﬀ between consistency and eﬃciency.
As a result, the long-run coeﬃcients on economic performance is derived from
the PMG estimator in the following discussion.
The first column in the table shows the long-run estimates based on the
ARDL model. As mentioned by Loayza and Ranciere (2006), the determination
of the lag order of the ARDL model generally involves a trade-oﬀ between
suﬃcient length and over-extension, given a limited time-series dimension. It is
worth noting that various authors have applied diﬀerent approaches for this lag
selection and, indeed, a number of studies have imposed a common lag structure
for all countries; e.g. Chudik et al. (2013). Other studies (Arnold et al. (2011);
Cavalcanti et al. (2015)) have suggested that the lag order of the ARDL be
selected via information criterion. Here, the lag order is selected via the BIC,
subject to a maximum lag of 2 on each of the explanatory variables in the ARDL
model. This resulted in an ARDL model incorporating a single period lag on
each of the variables, as depicted in the first column of the table.
From Column 1, the coeﬃcient on the error correction term is statistically
significant at the 1% level with a negative sign. This finding suggests that the
system reverts to the long-run values following a shock, indicating cointegration
among the variables. Also, per capita output is positively and significantly
related to domestic investment and human capital, and negatively related to
the corrected rate of population growth. Such findings are generally consistent
with the theoretical expectations of the augmented Solow model of Mankiw et al.
(1992). Meanwhile, the estimated coeﬃcients of both the financial development
indicator and of its quadratic term turn out to be significantly negative. This
implies that any increase in the private credit ratio would lead to a decrease in
15
Table 4: PMG Estimates of the Long-Run Eﬀects on Economic Performance: Full Sample
ARDL CS-ARDL CS-ARDL
No. of lagged CA 2 3
Long Run Equation
INV EST 0.756*** 0.304*** 0.527***
(0.054) (0.015) (0.025)
SSE 0.348*** 0.160*** 0.134***
(0.042) (0.022) (0.030)
POP -3.662*** -0.129** -1.574***
(0.324) (0.057) (0.139)
FINDEV -0.158** 0.031*** 0.071**
(0.064) (0.011) (0.029)
FINDEV 2 -0.054*** -0.039*** -0.017***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Short Run Equation
ECT -0.038*** -0.127*** -0.074***
(0.007) (0.025) (0.022)
∆INV EST 0.083*** 0.069*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
∆SSE 0.030 0.030 -0.007
(0.029) (0.034) (0.044)
∆POP 0.331 0.539 0.979**
(0.210) (0.402) (0.437)
∆FINDEV -0.067* -0.147*** -0.103
(0.037) (0.053) (0.065)
∆(FINDEV 2) -0.014 0.000 0.023
(0.015) (0.022) (0.031)
Constant 0.058*** 0.555*** 0.607***
(0.008) (0.107) (0.173)
Obs 2412 2345 2278
Pesaran CD 15.610 -0.455 -1.561
P-Value [0.000] [0.650] [0.119]
Notes: Estimates based on the error correction model. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at
5%; * significant at 10%.
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long-run real average output.
The validity of the PMG estimates in Column 1 is contingent on the as-
sumption that the errors are cross-sectionally independent. In order to test
this, the cross-section dependence (CD) test was conducted. Specifically, this
test uses the correlation-coeﬃcients between the time-series for each panel mem-
ber. Under the null hypothesis of cross-section independence, the CD statistic is
standard normally distributed. Here, the null is rejected at the conventional sig-
nificance levels. This then implies that failing to account for error cross-country
dependence renders the accuracy of PMG estimates questionable.
To overcome this, the CS-ARDL methodology is employed, which involves
including additional lagged cross-sectional averages of both the dependent vari-
ables and of all regressors in the estimation. A crucial step in the usage of the
CS-ARDL model is the selection of the lag order for the cross-sectional aver-
ages. It is widely accepted that the number of lagged cross-section averages
should be suﬃcient to overcome the concerns on cross-sectional dependence of
the residual. Guidance from previous studies, such as, Chudik and Pesaran
(2015) and Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), would suggest a lag length of 2 in
this application, whereas others, Chudik and Pesaran (2015) for instance, the
lag length should not exceed 3. Both scenarios are presented in our results.
Columns 2 and 3 in the table show the PMG estimates of these two CS-
ARDL model specifications. Here, the null hypothesis of cross-section indepen-
dence in the Pesaran CD test is not rejected, suggesting that any cross-sectional
dependence caused by common factors have been controlled for when the re-
gression is augmented with the lagged cross-sectional averages. As a result, the
PMG estimates under the CS-ARDL model are preferred.
In both Columns 2 and 3, the estimated coeﬃcient for the error correction
term is, again, negative and significant at the 1% level. Under both specifica-
tions, the estimated coeﬃcients of INV EST , SSE, and POP are significant
with the expected signs. The results show that a one percent increase in the
proportion of domestic investment over output is associated with an average
increase in steady-state per capita GDP of over 0.3 percent. Meanwhile, a one
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percent increase in the rate of secondary school enrollment is associated with an
average increase in steady-state level of real per capita output by more than 0.1
percent. A positive and significant eﬀect of the level of financial development
on the level of output performance is observed in both Columns 2 and 3. Mean-
while, the estimated coeﬃcient on the quadratic term of financial development
indicator is negative and significant at the 1% level. Such a finding supports
pervious empirics, including Shen and Lee (2006) and Arcand et al. (2015).
After controlling for cross-country heterogeneity and error cross-country de-
pendence, the relationship between financial development and economic perfor-
mance is found to be bell-shaped for the 69 countries examined here. Such a
finding suggests that more private credit raises output performance, but only
at low levels of credit and that high levels of private credit could exert a detri-
mental eﬀect on long-run economic performance. The ‘turning point’ of the
eﬀect is estimated to occur at around 150% of GDP. Within the sample used
here there are several examples where financial development exceeds this fig-
ure. Thus, for example, the ratio of private credit to GDP of both Malaysia
and Thailand reached 150% during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998.
Meanwhile, taking the examples of Canada, Denmark, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, private credit grew steadily from the early
2000s and exceeded 150% in 2007, the year before the global financial crisis.
Another interesting example is Japan. During the period of its economic cri-
sis from late 1980s to 2007, Japan’s private credit ratio never dropped below
150%. Noticeably, all of these countries, with the exception of Malaysia, are
democracies.
Turning to the democratic and non-democratic sub-samples, the results for
these two groups of countries are presented in Tables 5 and 6, where the first
columns of both tables give the PMG estimates derived on the basis of a sin-
gle lag for all variables. Columns 2 and 3 of these tables give the CS-ARDL
results incorporating 2 or 3 lags of the cross-section averages of dependent and
explanatory variables. As before, the coeﬃcient on the error correction term
is always negative and statistically significant and, as expected, the estimated
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coeﬃcient on INV EST turns out to be significantly positive in the long run,
while that of POP is negative using both ARDL and CS-ARDL approaches.
The PMG estimates in Table 5 show mixed results, especially with regard
to financial development. From first two columns, the estimated coeﬃcient for
FINDEV is positive and statistically significant. However, it is worth noting
that the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence under the Pesaran CD
test is strictly rejected. Column 3, reveals another another rejection of the
null for the CD test, although error cross-section dependence is reduced as the
statistic drops dramatically to around -2. Thus, these appear to provide the
most accurate estimates and show that the coeﬃcient estimate on FINDEV
is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. Also, the coeﬃcient on the square
of the financial development is positive, although this estimate fails to achieve
statistical significance.
Table 6 presents the estimates for the non-democratic countries. Here, the
results in the first column reveal some evidence of a positive, but insignifi-
cant, eﬀect of financial system development on long-term economic performance.
However, these results fail to account for error cross-section dependence. The
results for the CS-ARDL model presented in Columns 2 and 3 suggest that
the use of cross-section averages largely reduces residual cross-section depen-
dence. In particular, as the Pesaran CD test statistics drop to around -0.5, no
evidence of error cross-section dependence is uncovered in these two columns.
Therefore, concerns over the influence of macroeconomic linkages and common
shocks are eliminated. From last two columns, the estimated eﬀects on per
capita output of physical capital investment and human capital are all statis-
tically significant with the expected signs. Also, the estimated coeﬃcient on
FINDEV is positive, and significant. In this specification, the square of the
financial development term is also revealed to be positive and significant.
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Table 5: PMG Estimates of the Long-Run Eﬀects on Economic Performance: Democratic
Sub-sample
ARDL CS-ARDL CS-ARDL
No. of lagged CA 2 3
Long Run Equation
INV EST 0.552*** 0.922*** 0.709***
(0.053) (0.134) (0.050)
SSE 0.219*** -0.446*** -0.632***
(0.042) (0.106) (0.074)
POP -1.225*** -6.414*** -1.877***
(0.234) (0.801) (0.198)
FINDEV 0.965** 1.914*** -0.031
(0.095) (0.260) (0.045)
FINDEV 2 0.333*** 0.737*** 0.018
(0.032) (0.106) (0.019)
Short Run Equation
ECT -0.048*** -0.015* -0.051***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.020)
∆INV EST 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.091***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
∆SSE 0.009 -0.025 0.016
(0.034) (0.042) (0.049)
∆POP 0.098 0.069 0.621
(0.307) (0.386) (0.564)
∆FINDEV -0.023 -0.059 0.032
(0.046) (0.064) (0.074)
∆(FINDEV 2) -0.017 0.038 0.069
(0.023) (0.037) (0.042)
Constant 0.403*** 0.555*** 2.194***
(0.109) (0.107) (0.853)
Obs 1368 1330 1292
Pesaran CD 16.721 8.395 -2.482
P-Value [0.000] [0.000] [0.013]
Notes: Estimates based on the error correction model. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at
5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 6: PMG Estimates of the Long-Run Eﬀects on Economic Performance: Non-democratic
Sub-sample
ARDL CS-ARDL CS-ARDL
No. of lagged CA 2 3
Long Run Equation
INV EST 0.494*** 0.247*** 0.192***
(0.041) (0.023) (0.013)
SSE 0.190*** 0.366*** 0.047*
(0.022) (0.048) (0.026)
POP -0.952*** -0.833*** 1.024***
(0.169) (0.172) (0.083)
FINDEV 0.126 0.584*** 0.482***
(0.083) (0.065) (0.058)
FINDEV 2 -0.019 0.103*** 0.126***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Short Run Equation
ECT -0.070*** -0.114*** -0.174***
(0.021) (0.035) (0.067)
∆INV EST 0.032* 0.043* 0.009
(0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
∆SSE 0.064 0.084 0.125
(0.048) (0.053) (0.101)
∆POP 0.361 0.792 0.518
(0.276) (0.581) (1.199)
∆FINDEV -0.169*** -0.275*** -0.070
(0.055) (0.097) (0.160)
∆(FINDEV 2) -0.034*** -0.053** -0.002
(0.014) (0.026) (0.047)
Constant 0.519*** 0.744*** -1.641***
(0.148) (0.229) (0.590)
Obs 1044 1015 986
Pesaran CD 2.110 -0.573 -0.426
P-Value [0.035] [0.567] [0.670]
Notes: Estimates based on the error correction model. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at
5%; * significant at 10%.
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6. Concluding Remarks
In sum, the PMG results presented here for the full sample support the pos-
itive eﬀect of financial development on economic performance and also uphold
the non-linearity of this eﬀect, with the results suggesting a turning point in the
bell shaped function at around 150% of GDP. However, partitioning the sam-
ple of countries into democratic and non-democratic nations reveals noticeable
diﬀerences between the two groups.
For the democratic nations, although the CS-ARDL model with 2 lags did
result in a large positive coeﬃcient estimate on FINDEV , when an additional
3-period lag was introduced, in the most robust of our estimated specifications,
the statistical significance of the coeﬃcient disappeared. Furthermore, although
the coeﬃcient on the square of this variable was significant in the CS-ARDL 2
model, it was positive suggesting an ever-increasing rate of the eﬀect of finan-
cial development on growth, contrary to expectations. This coeﬃcient was not
significant in the CS-ARDL 3 model.
Turning to the non-democratic sub-sample, FINDEV was both positive and
statistically significant in both CS-ARDL models. The square of this variable
was also significant in both models but was, once again, positive in both spec-
ifications. Taken together these results imply that, for non-democratic states,
financial development has a positive eﬀect on economic performance and that
the strength of this eﬀect increases along with the level of financial development.
Thus, for these countries, the evidence presented here does not uphold the often
noted bell shaped relationship between finance and growth.
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Appendix
Table A1: List of Countries
Democracies Non-democracies
Argentina Italy Cameroon Panama
Australia Jamaica Cote D’Ivoire Peru
Barbados Japan Egypt Saudi Arabia
Bolivia Korea, Republic of Ethiopia Senegal
Brazil Malta Fiji Sierra Leone
Canada Mauritius Gabon Sudan
Chile New Zealand Gambia, The Swaziland
Costa Rica Paraguay Ghana Tanzania
Denmark Philippines Haiti Togo
Dominican Republic Portugal Kenya Uganda
Ecuador Sri Lanka Malawi
El Salvador Sweden Malaysia
Finland Switzerland Mali
Greece Thailand Mexico
Guatemala Trinidad & Tobago Morocco
Honduras Turkey Nepal
India United Kingdom Niger
Ireland United States Nigeria
Israel Venezuela Pakistan
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